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Exactly How Much Process is Due?
The Federal Courts Grapple with the
Shifting Burdens of Proof in Civil In Rem
Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 88 1(a)
BY DAVID A. COHEN*
"Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights."'
INTRODUCTION
sconceived and as practiced, civil forfeiture in the context of
a drug-trafficking prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 88 l(a) is one
of the most schizophrenic concepts in modem law.2 Prosecu-
tors love it, both because it affords them the chance to collect much needed
revenue3 and because it does so without the exacting standards and greater
"J.D. expected 1999. B.A. 1990, University of Kentucky. The author wishes
to extend thanks to Professor Sarah N. Welling of the College of Law, whose
continuing guidance made the research and writing of this Note a less ponderous
task.
'-United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993).
2The other common use of civil forfeiture is in the context of a prosecution for
money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1986). This Note will focus on the
statutory material contained in 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1984), which deals explicitly
with property acquired in connection with drug dealing.
3 See, e.g., Steven L. Kessler, For Want of a Nail: Forfeiture and the Bill of
Rights, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 205, 206 (1994) (discussing "routine use of
forfeited assets by prosecutors to fill their agency's coffers").
Former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh remarked in a panel discussion
that "'it's satisfying to think that it's now possible for a drug dealer to serve time
in a forfeiture-financed prison after being arrested by agents driving a forfeiture-
provided automobile while working in a forfeiture-funded sting operation.' "Arthur
W. Leach & John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to the
CivilForfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241,251 nn.38-39 (1994) (quoting
Seized Drug Funds to Pay for Prisons, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1989, at Al0).
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burden of proof demanded in a criminal proceeding.' Claimants despise it
because they begin at a disadvantage and because of the myriad hurdles
placed in the path to possible recovery of their property.'
What of the courts? Those who speak for the courts will be the first to
admit they are just plain confused, trapped between the competing
factions.' Particularly disadvantaged are the federal trial and appellate
courts, which are charged with enforcement while Congress and the
Supreme Court redraw the playing field. The courts are confronted by the
complicated and arcane mechanics of the forfeiture process.7 They also are
forced to balance the competing interests of claimants and the government,
ensuring that each party receives its appropriate measure of due process.'
The fundamental difference in burdens of proof is at the heart of the American
justice system. In a criminal proceeding, the prosecution is required to present
evidence that would satisfy a jury that the defendant is the person who committed
the offense. This standard is characterized as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8, at 67-85 (2d
ed. 1986). By contrast, the plaintiff in a civil action (here the government, which
is seeking forfeiture) is only required to meet a preponderance standard, making
the events in question more probable than not in the minds of the jury or the court.
See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFERY C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6, at 316-
18 (3d ed. 1985).
' See Kessler, supra note 3, at 206 ("In forfeiture actions, those claiming an
interest in or ownership of the subject property lose their individual characteristics
to those of the label, usually that of 'criminal,' 'friend of drug dealer,' or the
like.").
6 Vito J. Titone, an Associate Justice on the New York Court of Appeals, has
described civil forfeiture as "an Alice-in-Wonderland universe in which the
property owner generally has the burden of proof, lack of criminal culpability is
often not a defense and the government's rights vest from the time of the illegality
rather than the time of the judgment of forfeiture." Curtail Use of Civil Forfeiture,
N.Y. L.J., June 29, 1993, at 2 (citing 1 DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES 1.02, at 1-6 (1992)).
7 One commentator has described civil forfeiture as, "arcane and complex...
(it simply is not glamorous)." Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture andDouble
Jeopardy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 183, 226 (1996).
8 For a somewhat radical evaluation of problems for civil forfeiture claimants
in the drug context, see Nkechi Taifa, CivilForfeiture vs. CivilLiberties, 39 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 95 (1994). Taifa takes the position that while civil in rem forfeiture
was brought into being to serve the interests of justice and fight the war on drugs
(favoring the government), it has been subject to such egregious abuses by law
enforcement that it tips the scales against claimants and serves largely to produce
revenues that state taxes are unable to provide.
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Perhaps the most complicated element of the process is the administration
of a system that by design favors the government. 9
This Note will examine what happens when the federal courts confront
the rigors and strictures of the civil forfeiture process under § 88 1(a). Part
I will characterize the history of forfeiture and discuss recent decisions of
the Supreme Court that call into question the extreme degree of deference
previously afforded to congressionally designed forfeiture proceedings.
Part II will examine recent decisions by the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits that apply the Supreme Court's
recently formulated closer scrutiny of the forfeiture statutes at the appellate
level. In Part III, consideration is given to how the other circuits have
approached, or might approach, these issues. Part IV will address proposals
to reform the forfeiture laws through congressional rather than judicial
action.
Ultimately, this Note will posit that the Second and Ninth Circuits are
moving civil forfeiture jurisprudence in the right direction. The original
shape of forfeiture in the context of the so-called war on drugs seems to
have been a by-product of its time. That is to say, it was born in the 1970s
and came of age in the 1980s, a period in American history when many
things were outsized or overblown. As a consequence, the focus was as
much on the appearance of results as on real effectiveness. Civil forfeiture
suffers from the same malady: in an effort to combat the American drug
problem, this "get tough" legislation essentially gutted the due process
rights of defendants and of claimants of forfeited property, all in the name
of producing results.
Recognizing the due process problem, this Note will conclude that the
federal judiciary is taking appropriate steps to restore the balance that
Congress legislated away. It will further conclude that recent congressional
actions reinforce the apparent need for forfeiture reform, because even the
legislative branch now recognizes that the due process infirmities of the
present system go too far.
9 See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text for discussion of the forfeiture
process itself. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that Congress intended the
burden to lie largely with the claimant. This is apparent from the structure of 21
U.S.C. § 881(a), which assigns the government a relatively low burden of proof
(reasonable suspicion), then shifts the burden to the claimant to prove innocence
of the claimed property by a preponderance of the evidence.
1997-98]
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I. How DID WE GET HERE?
A SHORT HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
AND RECENT JURISPRUDENCE' °
A. The Historical Background of Forfeiture Statutes
Civil forfeiture is by no means a new idea, but rather dates from the
Old Testament and the concept ofnoxal surrender."I Under this procedure,
one whose ox gored another person was obliged to turn the ox over to the
government for ritual slaughter. 2 At common law, this idea of noxal
surrender was extended to cover both animate and inanimate chattels that
caused the death of a King's subject." Common examples included slaves,
beasts of burden, and inanimate objects like wagons and trees. 4 Known as
"deodands,"' 5 the King's bench required that the guilty chattel be turned
over to the sovereign that it might do no further harm. It is critical to note
that the res itself was considered guilty, separate from the person who used
it.' 6 This culpability of the res originally was viewed in terms of demonic
10 This discussion of the roots of forfeiture is by no means dispositive. For
judicial treatment, the reader is advised to consult Justice Brennan's excellent
summary in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-85
(1974). Many commentaries also contain excellent short histories of forfeiture. See
Jimmy Gurule, The Ancient Roots of Modern Forfeiture Law, 21 J. LEGIS. 155,
156-59 (1995); Terence Fennessy, Comment, Constitutional Law -Search and
Seizure, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 371, 373-75 (1995); Jon E. Gordon,
Note, Prosecutors Who Seize Too Much and the Theories They Love: Money
Laundering, Facilitation, and Forfeiture, 44 DUKE L.J. 744, 746-51 (1995);
Shannon T. Noya, Comment, Hoisted by Their Own Petard: Adverse Influences in
Civil Forfeiture, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493,497-505 (1996); David Scott
Romantz, Note, Civil Forfeiture and the Constitution -A Legislative Abrogation
ofRights and the Judicial Response: The Guilt of the Res, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
387, 393-96 (1994); see also Klein, supra note 7, at 191-97.
"See Exodus 21:28.
See Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, WrongfulDeath and the Western Notion ofSovereignty, 46
TEMP. L.Q. 169, 180-83 (1973).
"s See id. at 181-83.
14Seeid. at 181.
1" The word "deodand" derives from the Latin Deo dandum, "to be given to
God." Id. at 180 n.35. For a useful analysis on the evolution of the deodand, see
OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 24-26 (1881).
6 This condemnation of the property itself led to some rather unusual results.
For example, if a man fell from his horse into a river and was carried downstream
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possession, but the increasingly secular nature of English society trans-
formed the deodand into a species of homicide tax. 7 The forfeited property
was viewed as a kind of levy for wrongdoing, and the proceeds from its
disposition might be used to say Mass for the soul of the departed." A form
of statutory forfeiture also existed and was used as a punishment for
treason or the commission of a felony.19
The next major innovation regarding the forfeiture laws occurred in the
English admiralty courts in the seventeenth century.2" Here, forfeiture was
applied largely as a penalty for smuggling. The justification was that it
might be impossible to locate the record owner of the contraband.
Consequently, administrative convenience dictated a proceeding directly
against the res, which might produce a timely resolution of the matter. The
merchant class displayed enthusiasm for this remedy because it allowed for
more rapid adjudication - a major concern if the merchant had a creditor
demanding satisfaction.2 Forfeiture in admiralty survived the ocean
crossing to become a part of the Colonial legal canon, despite some
misgivings about the power of the admiralty courts left behind in
England.' It eventually evolved into a tool designed for the collection of
revenue due the government.'
and crushed in a grist mill, both the horse and the mill wheel could be subject to
forfeiture. See Finkelstein, supra note 12, at 185.
7 See Finkelstein, supra note 12, at 179-80; see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S.
at 680-8 1. It is important to note that the deodand was a creature of statute, while
the noxal surrender was largely a religious device.
'
8See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681.
'
9See id. at 682 ("The convicted felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and
his lands escheated to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all of his property,
real and personal, to the Crown.").
20 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 612 (1993) (discussing the use of
civil forfeiture in maritime claims).
2 For further discussion of the merchant classes and maritime forfeiture, see
George F. Steckley, Merchants and the Admiralty Court During the English
Revolution, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 137, 143-51 (1978). Proceedings in the
Exchequer Court under the Navigation Acts of the mid-seventeenth century are
discussed in James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law -
Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 775-78 (1977).
2 Despite the colonists' misgivings, an admiralty forfeiture statute eventually
was promulgated by Congress, in 1789. Both of these ideas are discussed in United
States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1980).
' Early cases bear out the idea that the United States viewed civil forfeiture as
a tool for collection of tax revenues and customs duties. See, e.g., Dobbins's
1997-98]
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As a tool for law enforcement, civil forfeiture remained a largely
dormant device in this country until 1970, when Congress enacted the
Controlled Substances Act.24 21 U.S.C. § 881 provides for civil forfeiture
of property upon violation of the drug laws, regardless of whether or not a
criminal conviction for the offense is ever obtained.2" Many categories of
property are subject to forfeiture, including houses and real property,
cars, boats, and sums of currency.26 The Congressional motive in enacting
Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel,
43 U.S. (2 How.) 91 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
24 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1970).
' 21 U.S.C. § 881 was codified in 1984 and was not part of the original Con-
trolled Substances Act.
26 The most-used portions of the statute provide in pertinent part:
(a) Subject property
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured,
distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, orvessels, which are
used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9), except that -
(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the
transaction of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under
the provisions of this section unless it shall appear that the owner or
other person in charge of such conveyance was a consenting party or
privy to a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter;
(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this
section by reason of any act or omission established by the owner
thereof to have been committed or omitted by any person other than
such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully in the possession
of a person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of
the United States, or of any State; and
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the
extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission
established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without
the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner.
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm,
tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this
subchapter.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
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§ 881 is clear: to remove from the drug dealer the spoils of his occupa-
tion, thereby making drug dealing a less attractive proposition. Because
of this goal, the procedure is canted to allow the government to pre-
vail.27
Forfeitures under § 881(a) follow a distinct pattern. The first step is for
the prosecutor to allege that the property in question is involved with a drug
transaction. Assuming the facts alleged are sufficient, a warrant in rem will
then be issued by a magistrate for the "arrest" of the property. If the
forfeiture is not opposed by a defendant or claimant, the proceeding
remains largely administrative in character.28 A claimant (not necessarily
the defendant) may request an evidentiary hearing, which converts the
proceedings to a judicial action even if there is no criminal proceeding
concerning the drug transaction.29
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange
for a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds
traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments,
and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of
this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any
appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used,
in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a).
27 The inherent disparity in burdens of proof of claimants and the government
makes it unlikely at the outset that a claimant will prevail. As noted in the
Introduction, this is an indicator that Congress was willing to sacrifice a measure
of basic fairness for an opportunity to successfully wage its war on drugs. For
additional descriptive material on the difference in burdens of proof, see infra notes
30-34 and accompanying text.
2 See Kiefer v. United States Dep't of Justice, 687 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (D.
Minn. 1988).29See id.
1997-981
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The government is required to prove the connection between the
property and the transaction in question by a standard that approximates
probable cause.30 If the government produces sufficient evidence, the
burden of proof then shifts to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the property is innocent, or that the claimant had no
knowledge of the illicit use.3 If the government prevails, there is a
disposition of the assets, with the proceeds going to the Federal Asset
Forfeiture Fund maintained by the Treasury Department.32 Given the
relatively light burden placed on the government and the much heavier
burden that the claimant bears, it is unusual for a claimant to prevail.
Forfeitures are more often overturned on appeal because the seizure of the
property was somehow defective than because the claimant was able to
mount a successful defense. 33
As will be further explored below, this burden shifting raises serious
due process concerns. Particularly for a claimant who is invoking an
innocent-owner defense, there is something inherently unfair about the
shifting burden of proof.34 This unfairness is magnified by the requirement
that the claimant adduce greater proof to recover the property than the
30 Courts have characterized the level of proof needed by the government as a
"substantial connection" or a nexus, with the latter appearing to be the preferred
version at present. See United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1993).
31 The burden-shifting mechanism is set out in 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1984).
32 The Asset Forfeiture Fund has been the focus of intense scrutiny because the
monies therein are shared between the Department of Justice, the Drug
Enforcement Agency, and state and local law enforcement agencies. The
unfortunate consequence of this arrangement is that prosecutors have sometimes
viewed forfeiture as a convenient way to make up budgetary shortfalls. For a
discussion of the ways in which Fund monies are used, see Civil Asset Forfeiture:
Hearings on Asset Forfeiture before the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S.
House ofRepresentatives, July 22, 1996, 1996 WL 410099 (Statement of Stefan
Cassella, Deputy Chief of Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section,
Criminal Division); see also Taifa, supra note 8, at 97-107 (discussing the
problems created by overzealous use of the forfeiture laws).
" See, e.g., United States v. Lot Six (6), Block One (1), Mills Second Sub-
division, 48 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1995) (voiding forfeiture due to the lack of a pre-
seizure hearing).
34 Innocent-owner defenses are available for those subsections of 21 U.S.C. §
881 dealing with conveyances under (a)(4), money and secure instruments under
(a)(6), and real property under (a)(7). The innocent-owner defenses require that the
claimant lacked knowledge of the drug transaction or did not consent to it. The
claimant cannot have been willfully blind to the transaction.
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government must present to institute the forfeiture proceeding.35 In recent
cases the Supreme Court has recognized the questionable constitutionality
of this inherent disparity, and has begun to move away from the extreme
deference previously afforded Congress's statutory scheme.
B. Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Civil Forfeiture
The Supreme Court has so far identified two areas in which civil
forfeiture implicates constitutional concerns, namely the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment36 and the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment.37 The leading case in the former category is United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property.38 Good was convicted under
Hawaii law for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia in his home.
Some four years later, the government filed an action of forfeiture under §
881(a)(7), seeking to forfeit Good's house because it had been used to
facilitate a drug transaction. The house, which was rented to others while
Goodwas living in Nicaragua, was seized without notice and without a pre-
seizure hearing.39 The government executed an occupancy agreement with
the tenants, but garnished the rent monies as part of the seizure.40 Good
returned to Hawaii and filed a motion to claim the property, but the district
court granted the government's motion for summary judgment. On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit held unanimously that the lack of both notice and a
hearing violated the Due Process Clause.4 Following a grant of certiorari,
the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit, ruling that except in the
most exigent circumstances, the government may not seize forfeited
property without notice to the record owner and a pre-seizure hearing to
evaluate the reasonableness of the government's suspicion of a nexus
between the drugs and the property.42
15 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (describing the relative bur-
dens of proof).36
" No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... "U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed ..... U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
3 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).39 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property Titled in the Name of
James Daniel Good, 971 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1992), afd inpart, rev'd in
part by 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
40 See Good, 510 U.S. at 47.
4, See Good, 971 F.2d at 1378.
42 See Good, 510 U.S. at 53-62.
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In evaluating the seizure in Good, the Court borrowed a three-prong
test from Mathews v. Eldridge,43 which concerned the claimant's loss of
federal workers' compensation benefits without an administrative hearing.'
In evaluating whether the claimant had a vested right that required the
protections of due process, the Court weighed the import of evenly
administering the workers' compensation system against the rights and
reliance interest of the claimant.45 The Eldridge Court concluded that the
claimant's due process rights hadnot been violated, even though he did not
receive an evidentiary hearing before loss of his benefits.46 This conclusion
was predicated on the twin notions that sufficient protections existed to
safeguard a claimant's interest and further protections beyondthose already
in place would unduly burden administration of the system.47
The Court reached the opposite result in Good. Justice Kennedy
concluded that because rights in real property are so central to society,48
and because protection of due process is critical where real property may
be lost, the government has an affirmative obligation to protect the
claimant's interests even inthe forfeiture context. The Court concludedthat
alternative procedural safeguards could not replace the protections that
I3 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
44 See id. at 323-25.45 See id. at 348. InEldridge, Justice Powell described the three-prong test used
to determine whether a claimant has been afforded his or her full measure of due
process:
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of
due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First,
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 334-35. The comparable formulation of this test is found in Good, 510 U.S.
at 53.
" See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348-49.47 See id.
48 Justice Kennedy wrote:
The seizure of a home produces a far greater deprivation than the loss of
furniture, or even attachment. It gives the Government not only the right to
prohibit sale, but also the right to evict occupants, to modify the property,
to condition occupancy, to receive rents, and to supersede the owner in all
rights pertaining to the use, possession, and enjoyment of the property.
Good, 510 U.S. at 54.
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would be afforded by timely notice and the opportunity to be heard (the
twin hallmarks of due process protection in constitutional jurispru-
dence).49
The leading recent case on the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment is Austin v. United States." Richard Austin pled guilty to a
drug-trafficking offense under South Dakota state law, and the government
sought forfeiture of both his mobile home and his body shop under §
88 l(a)(4) and (a)(7) as facilitating property. Austin opposed the forfeiture,
but the district court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment.5 1 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit "'reluctantly agreed with the
government' and affirmed."' 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address a growing split within the circuits regarding whether a civil
forfeiture is subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. The Court addressed
whether a federal court should grant forfeiture of the entirety or apply a
proportionality test in determining what property should be forfeited.5 3
Justice Blackmun framed the issue as whether civil forfeiture is
considered punishment, and thus subject to the Eighth Amendment's
protections.5 4 He concluded that the primary purpose of modem civil
forfeiture is to punish. Although it may serve a remedial purpose, it serves
largely to extract punitive payments due the government, and as such is
subject to the strictures of Excessive Fines Clause analysis.55 Rather than
adopt a uniform standard for analyzing forfeiture cases under the dictates
49 See id. at 62. Applying the Eldridge factors, Justice Kennedy concluded that
the correct factors to balance were Good's ownership interest in the property, the
minimal due process protection afforded where the government seizes property
with no notice and no pre-seizure hearing, the poor quality of relief that may be
provided if the government attempts to cure a defective seizure with a post-seizure
hearing, and the government's minimal interest in seizing the property without
notice where no exigent circumstances exist that might cause loss of the property.
See id. at 53-59. Speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy wrote, "Unless exigent
circumstances are present, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to
afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real property
subject to civil forfeiture." Id. at 62.
5' Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
", See id. at 605.
52Id. at 605-06 (quoting United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814,
817 (8th Cir. 1992), overruled by Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)).53 See id. at 606.
54 See id. at 602, 610-20.
-5 See id. at 622.
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of the Eighth Amendment, the Court elected to remand, allowing the circuit
courts to adopt their own preferred standards on a case-by-case basis.16
The import of these decisions is uncertain.57 Until the cases were
decided in 1993, the posture of the federal courts had been extremely
deferential to the congressional design implicit in the civil forfeiture laws.
In the aftermath of the decisions, the federal courts were presented with
reasonable indicators that the Supreme Court would more closely examine
forfeitures for possible constitutional infirmities. In this atmosphere, it was
not surprising when the circuit courts began to express doubts of their own.
II. THE APPELLATE COURTS WEIGH IN
A. The Maverick Second Circuit
Perhaps because the city of New York, still a crossroads for American
commerce and culture, is found within its confines, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals tends to be something of a leader in developing areas of
the law. For example, at the time Austin was decided by the Supreme
Court, the Second Circuit was the only circuit to have ruled dispositively
on the issue of whether civil forfeitures should be subjected to excessive
fines analysis.58 In this context, it should come as no surprise that the
Second is one of two circuits to have spoken regarding the constitutionality
of the burden-shifting mechanism in civil in rem forfeiture under § 881 (a).
The first case addressing these due process concerns (whether civil
forfeitures should be analyzed under the Excessive Fines Clause) is United
States v. Daccarett.59 If Hollywood had produced a draft script for a drug
16 See id. at 622-23. For an in-depth discussion of proportionality analysis in the
aftermath of Austin, see Sarah N. Welling & Medrith Lee Hager, Defining
Excessiveness: Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture After Austin v.
United States, 83 KY. L.J. 835 (1994-95).57 It should be noted that the decision in Good has by no means undermined the
strong presence of the federal asset forfeiture scheme in the civil context. Within
three years after the Court questioned civil forfeiture in Good and Austin, it firmly
upheld 21 U.S.C. § 88 1(a) inBennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, reh'g denied, 116
S. Ct. 1560 (1996), and United States v. Usery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996), also
considered seminal cases.
58 See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35-39 (2d Cir.
1992) (finding the Eighth Amendment applicable to in rem civil forfeiture, but
nevertheless ruling that the forfeiture ordered in the case was not disproportionate
to the drug offense in question).
" United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993).
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case, it could not have told a story better than the real-life facts of the
case." In the late 1980s and early 1990s, members of the Cali cocaine
cartel concluded there was a need to launder their drug profits through
banks in Europe and the United States. The money was moved from banks
in Colombia and Panama to the United States and on to European nations
by means of electronic funds transfers ("EFTs"), after accounts were
opened at the European banks by employees of the cartel.61 Interpo1
62
eventually became aware of the illicit financial activity, and followed the
cartel employees to Luxembourg. 3 There the employees were arrested on
money laundering charges in connection with the EFTs. In a cooperative
0 This recital of the facts is intended to be summary in nature. The reader is
strongly encouraged to consult id. at 43-45. The reader may also wish to consult
the statement of facts in the district court decision, United States v. All Funds on
Deposit in anyAccounts Maintained at MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 801
F. Supp. 984, 987-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
61 See Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 43. Judge Pratt described the electronic funds trans-
fer procedure in this fashion:
When a customer wants to commence an EFT, its bank sends a message to
the transfer system's central computer, indicating the amount of money to
be transferred, the sending bank, the receiving bank, and the intended
beneficiary. The central computer then adjusts the account balances of the
sending and receiving banks and generates a printout of a debit ticket at the
sending bank and a credit ticket at the receiving bank. After the receiving
bank gets the credit ticket, it notifies the beneficiary of the transfer. If the
originating bank and the destination bank belong to the same wire transfer
system, then they are the only sending and receiving banks, and the transfer
can be completed in one transaction. However, if the originating bank and
the destination bank are not members of the same wire transfer system,
which is often the case with international transfers, it is necessary to transfer
the funds by a series of transactions through one or more intermediary
banks.
Id. at 43-44.The United States banks in question acted as intermediaries, passing
the money from the Latin American banks on to Europe. See id.
62 Interpol is the fnternational Criminal Police Organization, created in 1923 to
facilitate international police cooperation to combat criminal activity. Interpol is
funded by its member nations and allows for cooperative efforts to build evidence
and cases against individuals involved in crime on an international level. Its goals
are to "provide and promote assistance among all criminal police authorities under
the laws of each nation and to help all institutions that can act effectively in the
cause of prevention and suppression of crime." PETER G. LEE, INTERPOL 18-25
(1976).
63 See Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 44.
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effort with international law enforcement, the United States moved to
attach EFT proceeds that were temporarily on the books of U.S. banks.'
This move was intended to keep the illicit funds from being moved back to
the cartel's accounts in Latin America.61 The government then moved to
forfeit the funds under § 88 l(a)(6).66
Seventeen claimants sought to recover portions of the forfeited EFT
funds. Some were legitimate clothing export firms from Colombia, while
others were dummy corporations established solely for the purpose of
laundering the drug money. The district judge held an in camera hearing to
evaluate the government's claim of probable cause and found it sufficient,
and the case proceeded to trial.67 Of the twenty-two forfeited amounts in
question, the jury eventually concluded that eighteen were properly
forfeited to the government in connection with drug trafficking.68
What makes Daccarett a significant case in the due process context is
not the unusual subject matter of the forfeiture, but rather the evaluative
discussion in both the trial and appellate opinions of the burden-shifting
mechanism. All seventeen claimants presented evidence to counter the
government's forfeiture claims, but only two prevailed. To District Judge
Weinstein, this spoke volumes about the structure of the forfeiture statutes.
Although the judge conceded that he was bound by Second Circuit
precedent upholding the constitutionality of the shifting burden of proof,69
his reservations were grave. Indeed, Judge Weinstein bluntly stated, "The
structure of this kind of case is inherently unfair to claimants .... 2 0
This sentiment resonates in Judge Pratt's majority opinion for the
Second Circuit. His initial concern was that the uses of forfeiture continue
to expand, creating ever more need for the courts to be vigilant regarding
due process concerns, 71 and ever more opportunities for the government to
'4 See supra note 61 (describing the mechanics of the EFT procedure).
61 See Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 44.
66 See id. at 43-45.
67 See id. at45.68 See id.
69 The Second Circuit had previously ruled on a constitutional challenge to the
burden-shifting mechanism, stating, "We find nothing unconstitutional in
congress's [sic] allocation of the burdens of proof in forfeiture cases ...... United
States v. 228 Acres of Land and Dwelling Located on White's Hill Road, 916 F.2d
808, 814 (2d Cir. 1990).
70United States v. All Funds on Deposit in any Accounts Maintained at Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 801 F. Supp. 984, 991 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
71 See Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 46 ("Given that the reach of civil forfeiture is con-
stantly expanding to new realms - in this case, to electronic funds transfers between
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tread on claimants' due process rights. Judge Pratt went on to uphold the
forfeitures in the case, but it is clear that the Second Circuit was quite
troubled by the structure of the forfeiture laws. 2 Citing Judge Weinstein's
characterization of inherent unfairness, Pratt went on to point out that the
Second Circuit had previously upheld the constitutionality of the burden-
shifting mechanism. Nevertheless, he bluntly stated, "We therefore stress the
need for courts to ensure that what little due process is provided for in the
statutory scheme is preserved in practice. ' "7
The irony in this is manifest, because this was the same Judge Pratt who
penned the majority opinion upholding the constitutionality of the burden-
shifting mechanism only three years earlier. In United States v. 228 Acres of
Land and Dwelling Located on White's Hill Road,74 the defendant was
prosecuted for trafficking in heroin. In defending against the forfeiture of his
real property, Saverio Moreno raised an explicit as-applied constitutional
challenge to the burden-shifting mechanism. Writing for a unanimous panel
of the appellate court, Judge Pratt stated, "We find nothing unconstitutional
in congress's [sic] allocation ofthe burdens ofproofin forfeiture cases .... ,75
By contrast, Daccarett presented no explicit constitutional challenge, but the
Second Circuit sua sponte indicated that the constitutionality of the burden-
shifting mechanism was an open question.76 However, the court leftresolution
of that question for another day.
banks- the courts must ensure that constitutional and procedural safeguards remain
intact."). One of the opinions in Good expressed a collateral concern about the
ever-expanding use of civil forfeiture. See Good, 510 U.S. 43, 82 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Given that current practice... appears
to be far removed from the legal fiction upon which the civil forfeiture doctrine is
based, it may be necessary - in an appropriate case - to reevaluate our generally
deferential approach to legislative judgments in this area....").
' Judge Pratt cited to the Second Circuit's earlier decision in United States v.
All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1992), wherein the
court observed, "We continue to be enormously troubled by the government's
increasing and virtually unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the
disregard for due process that is buried in those statutes." Id. at 905.
73Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 57.
74United States v. 228 Acres of Land and Dwelling Located on White's Hill
Road, 916 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1990).
751Id. at 814.
76 In concluding the opinion, Judge Pratt wrote, "Given the relative ease with
which the statutory scheme allows the government to seize suspect properties, it is
imperative for courts to analyze carefully the forfeiture process in light of the fifth
amendment's due process demands and the fourth amendment's probable-cause
and warrant requirements." Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 59. While every first-year law
student knows that a court will decline to rule on an issue not raised by one of the
parties, commentators give thanks for this kind of insight into the working judicial
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The Second Circuit revisited the burden-shifting issue three years later
in UnitedStates v. 194 QuakerFarms Road.77 Richard Sciannawas charged
in connection with a drug-trafficking operation designed to move cocaine
from Colombia and Brazil into the eastern United States.78 Following
Scianna's arrest on drug charges, the government sought forfeiture of his
home as facilitating property under § 88 1(a)(7). Scianna's case is unusual
in that he expressly waived the probable cause hearing at the outset of the
forfeiture proceeding. The district court issued a warrant in rem for the
property and subsequently ordered the house forfeited. Scianna submitted
evidence in his favor at trial, but was unable to prevail.79
On appeal, the Second Circuit was once again required to evaluate the
constitutional viability ofthe burden-shifting mechanism. As Judge Winter
noted, because Scianna waived the probable cause hearing, the inquiry
could not embrace the sufficiency of the government's probable cause, but
was confined to the claimant's burden of proof.80 He began his analysis by
recalling that Second Circuit precedent favors the congressional apportion-
ment of the burden of proof between the government and the claimant.8
Judge Winter was quick to point out that the Supreme Court's decisions in
Good and Austin leave as "an open question whether Section 881(a)(7)
warrants civil or criminal due process protections, or possibly some hybrid
of the two."82 As with Judge Pratt's opinion in Daccarett, Judge Winter
declined to squarely address the issue of whether the burden-shifting
mechanism in civil forfeiture violates a claimant's due process rights.
8 3
71 United States v. 194 Quaker Farms Road, 85 F.3d 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub noma. Scianna v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 304 (1996).8 See Scianna v. McGuire, Civ. No. 3:94CV761 (AHN), 1996 WL 684400, at
*2 (D. Conn. Mar. 21, 1996).
71 See 194 Quaker Farms Road, 85 F.3d at 987-88.
" See id. at 989 ("Scianna's present challenge must be limited to the constitu-
tionality of requiring a claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
affirmative defense of innocent owner.").
81 See supra notes 69, 72 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
$2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1982) (declining to
overturn the forfeiture statute's burden of proof).
82 194 Quaker Farms Road, 85 F.3d at 989.
83 It is difficult to gauge which way this reluctance to discuss the issue cuts. It
is axiomatic that courts will not decide issues admittedly present but not raised by
one of the parties. However, this did not prevent Judge Pratt from analyzing the due
process issue inDaccarett. In 194 QuakerFarms Road, Judge Winter might merely
have been conforming to the judicial tradition of side-stepping constitutional issues
if a case can be decided on other bases. See, e.g., United States v. $49,576.00 U.S.
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In lieu of explicitly addressing the larger constitutional issue, the
Second Circuit in 194 Quaker Farms Road opted to echo the earlier
sentiments of Daccarett. Thus, the court stated that although Congress may
allocate the greater burden of proof to the claimant, it remains to be
determined in the aftermath of Good and Austin exactly what quantum of
proof the government needs to present to seize the property and instigate
the forfeiture process.84 Further, it remains an open question, after the
Supreme Court decisions, what burden of proof must be placed on the
government to satisfy due process before the burden shifts to the claimant."
In contrast to Daccarett, 194 Quaker Farms Roadhas less to say on the
putative constitutionality of the burden-shifting mechanism. This is
precisely, the import of the case. Three years after the decision in
Daccarett, the Second Circuit still found itself waiting for the appropriate
fact pattern to rule dispositively on the constitutional issue. In the
meantime, the court is content to reserve the question for another day, so
long as those within its jurisdiction are mindful that the question is by no
means settled.86
B. The Ninth Circuit Joins the Parley
Nestled at the opposite end of the country from the Second Circuit, the
Ninth is no less of an innovator in making law. One need merely recall that
the original due process decision in Goodwas penned by the Ninth Circuit,
which unanimously found the government's action violative of the
Currency, 116 F.3d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1997) (Hall, J., concurring in part)
(criticizing the majority for reaching constitutional issues unnecessarily). More
likely, Judge Winter opted to echo the rationale from Daccarett to avoid proffering
another opinion in what already is an unsettled area of the law.84 See 194 Quaker Farms Road, 85 F.3d at 990.
8' Judge Winter wrote:
[W]e also note that it is an open issue "whether the due process clause
requires the government to sustain a burden falling between the extremes
of probable cause and proof beyond a reasonable doubt" before a seizure is
made and a claimant is put to proof of the innocent owner defense.
Id. at 991 (citing Peter Petrou, Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the
Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Proceedings Arising Out of Illegal Drug
Transactions, 1984 DuKE L.J. 822, 827).
" See id. at 990-91 n.2. Judge Winter takes the position that the Supreme Court
has called the viability of the statute under a due process analysis into question, and
that the Second Circuit will reserve judgment for another day because "Good and
Austin without a doubt reopen the issue." Id.
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claimant's rights.8 7 From this, it is apparent that the Ninth Circuit is on an
equal footing with the Second, serving as a west coast watchdog for due
process violations in forfeiture proceedings.
This overt concern with claimants' fights was expressed in the court's
decision in United States v. $49,576. 00 U.S. Currency,"8 decided in June of
1997. The court's decision follows the pattern of many currency forfeiture
cases, in that it requires evaluation of whether carrying a large sum of cash
creates a presumption that the claimant is involved in drug-related
activities. The District Court for the Central District of California thought
so; however, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. 9
In January 1994, claimant Francisco Lombera boarded an American
Airlines flight in Dallas. The flight was bound for Ontario, California, and
gate agents alerted DEA personnel in California that Lombera had
purchased a one-way ticket with cash moments before boarding the plane.'
The ticket was purchased under the name of"Jacinto Rodriguez," and when
agents confronted Lombera upon arrival, they had in their possession the
bag checked in Rodriguez's name. The bag contained a large amount of
cash rolled up inside a pair of blue jeans.91 A search of Lombera's person
revealed that he was carrying a resident alien identification card in his own
name, a California driver's license in the name of Rodriguez, and some
$2000 in addition to the money in the suitcase. Lombera refused to dis-
cuss the origins of the money, but accompanied the DEA agents to their
office. The money was subsequently confiscated but Lombera was
released.92
The government sought to subject the money to forfeiture under §
881 (a)(6) as the proceeds of drug-related activity. The district court ruled
that the government had probable cause to believe the money was drug-
related and shifted the burden to Lomberato prove otherwise. When he was
unable to meet this burden, the court ordered the money forfeited. On
appeal, Lombera challenged both the probable cause ruling and the
constitutionality of the shifting burden of proof.93
8
,SeeUnited States v. James Daniel GoodProperty Titled in theName ofJames
Daniel Good, 971 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'd inpart, rev'dinpartby 510 U.S.
43 (1993).
'
8United States v. $49,576.00 U.S. Currency, 116 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997).
9 See id. at 427.
90 See id. at 426-27.
9
' See id. at 427.
92See id.
9 See id.
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The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court and reversed the
forfeiture. 94 The court found the forfeiture constitutionally infirm on the
basis of the proof that the government adduced to prove probable cause.
The government had relied on the fact that a drug dog detected the presence
of narcotics on the money.' However, the court took notice of the fact that
virtually all paper money currently in circulation bears some traces of drug
contamination.96 The government also relied on the presumptive relation-
ship between carrying large sums of currency and drug activity, but the
court concluded that this presumption will not withstand Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny in the absence of fully realized proof.97 Judge Kozinski
acknowledged that use of such a "drug courier profile" might serve to
establish suspicion, but failed to rise to the level of probable cause
sufficient to institute an in rem forfeiture.9"
Because the court found that the seizure of Lombera's money would
not pass constitutional muster on aprobable causebasis, it was unnecessary
to rule on the as-applied constitutional challenge to the shifting burden of
proof. Nevertheless, the court included some dicta discussing the evolving
state of due process in the forfeiture context. Judge Kozinski began by
noting that the Ninth Circuit had explicitly affirmed the constitutionality
of the burden-shifting mechanism in United States v. One 1970 Pontiac
GTO.99 He went on to note that in the aftermath of Good and Austin, the
Ninth Circuit could no longer justify blanket adherence to viewing the
burden-shifting mechanism as constitutional. In this analysis, Judge
Kozinski looked explicitly to the ruling by the Second Circuit in 194
Quaker Farms Road, and in particular to the notion that the Supreme Court
decisions leave the constitutionality of the burden-shifting mechanism an
open question. 10°
94 See id. at 428.
15 See id. at 427-28.
96 Id. (citing United States v. United States Currency, $30, 060.00, 39 F.3d
1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 1994)).97 See id. at 428.
9 Id. The factors indicative of suspicious behavior but failing to rise to the level
of probable cause included use of false identification, nervous behavior during
questioning, and evasive or dishonest answers during questioning. See id.
'9 United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[W]e
conclude that the challenged forfeiture statutes are not criminal enough to prevent
Congress from imposing the burden of proof on the claimant, and we uphold the
constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. § 881 .... "). Id. at 66.
""' See $49,576.00 U.S.. Currency, 116 F.3d at 428-29.
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Writing for two members of the panel,'' Kozinski suggested two
fundamental reasons that the burden-shifting mechanism offends due
process. First, he characterized allowing the government to forfeit property
in a proceeding where there is such a disparity in the relative burdens of
proof as a "constitutional anomaly."'0 2 Next, he echoed the sentiments
expressed by Justice Kennedy in Good regarding the critical role that real
and personal property play in American society:
The stakes are exceedingly high in a forfeiture proceeding: Claimants are
threatened with permanent deprivation of their property, from their
hard-earned money, to their sole means of transport, to their homes. We
would find it surprising were the Constitution to permit such an important
decision to turn on a meager burden of proof like probable cause.
0 3
Unsurprisingly, Judge Kozinski's opinion concluded, "We leave the
ultimate resolution of this question for another day."'
A pattern emerges. By its ruling in Daccarett, the Second Circuit left
the matter unresolved, providing little guidance other than adverse
precedent for the panel deciding 194 Quaker Farms Road. A similar
difficulty exists in the Ninth Circuit, where the court has reserved the
constitutionality question for another day. The problem, simply stated, is
that until the Ninth Circuit rules dispositively, 1970 Pontiac GTO's
presumption of constitutionality is still the law. District court judges and
even other members of the appellate bench are to be forgiven if they are not
quite sure where things stand.
This point was brought to bear by the Central District of California less
than a month after $49,576 00 was decided. United States v. Marof' 105
101 Judge Hall included a terse concurring opinion in which she indicated that
the court ought not to have reached the constitutional issue at all. She opined,
"Judge Kozinski's disquisition in Part III on the constitutionality of burden-shifting
in forfeiture proceedings is entirely dictum. Moreover, it is dictum on an important
constitutional issue, thus violating our rule against reaching constitutional questions
unless we must in order to dispose of a case." Id. at 429 (Hall, J., concurring in
part).
10 2 Id. (citing 1 DAvID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE
CASES 2.04, AT 2-37 (1996)). The judge went on to indicate that if, as the
Supreme Court has suggested, burdens of proof are intended to indicate the relative
importance of each party's role, this allocation sends the wrong message. See id.
103 Id.
1I4 Id.
105 United States v. Marolf, 973 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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concerned forfeiture under § 881 (a)(4) of a boat used to smuggle marijuana
into the United States. Because the claimant was unable to present evidence
sufficient to rebut the government's reasonable doubt, the court ordered
forfeiture of the vessel."°6 In a footnote, Judge Stotler recognized the
divergence of opinions regarding the constitutionality of the shifting burden
of proof. However, despite the Ninth Circuit's strong questioning of the
mechanism in $49,576.00, "inthe absence of a determination otherwise, the
district court is bound to follow One 1970 Pontiac GTO."'107
This position will become untenable if it persists for very long. The
trial courts may weigh in on the issue, as did Judge Weinstein inAllFunds
(later Daccarett), but ultimately it is the courts of appeals that will speak
directly to the issue. Holding constitutionality as an open question may in
fact make things worse for claimants, both because it promotes an air of
uncertainty and because it forecloses the Supreme Court from ruling on the
issue.'08
IE. WHAT MIGHT THE OTHER CIRCUITS Do?
Given the preliminary conclusion by the Second andNinth Circuits that
the burden-shifting mechanism of in rem forfeiture is probably violative of
due process, the obvious question becomes whether the other circuits will
agree. In considering this question, it is helpful to look at four common
characteristics that courts use in evaluating forfeiture cases, and which
provide clues as to how the circuits might rule.
The first characteristic is imputed from the way in which the circuit
courts talk about the shifting burden of proof in civil forfeiture cases. It is
unlikely that the Department of Justice distributes a manual of literary style
to be used when discussing forfeitures, but readers of the cases might be
forgiven for concluding otherwise. The opinions follow a predictable
10 6 See id. at 1152.
107 Id. at 1152 n.17.
08 Obviously, the Supreme Court cannot review a circuit court decision on the
constitutionality of the burden-shifting mechanism until one of the circuits rules
dispositively. In the interim, the question is styled in a fashion that the law
despises: an intriguing idea, but one to which as yet no one is fully committed.
Simply put, until a statement about constitutionality is the holding of an appellate
opinion, it remains obiter dicta.
It should be noted that this Note confines itself to analyzing the due process
issue. Excessive Fines Clause analysis remains a contested issue in the aftermath
of Austin. For a useful overview of Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence, the
reader is encouraged to consult Welling & Hager, supra note 56.
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pattern: The court lays out the factual details of the case on appeal, briefly
describes the structure of the burden-shifting mechanism, and then goes on
to discuss whatever other aspects of the law are implicated by the case.109
Two conclusions can be drawn from this pattern. The first is that the
circuits regard the burden-shifting as presumptively constitutional, so that
little effort is required to detail the mechanism and proceed to the other
matters at hand. The second conclusion, really a variant of the first, is that
the recitation is a tautology: The courts give great deference to the scheme
Congress established without giving it much thought. This possibility is
reinforced by Justice Thomas' separate opinion in Good, where he notes
that even the members of the highest federal bench have used a "generally
deferential approach to legislative judgments in this area .... ,,10 This
sentiment is echoed by the Seventh Circuit, which has stated, "The
procedures and standard of proof employed in forfeiture proceedings are
well established." '' This kind of writing coming from the judicial pen
seems to indicate a paucity of evaluation. The attitude expressed is that
Congress established a system that is widely and effectively used, so why
examine it critically? This point is brought to bear most forcefully by those
cases in which the forfeiture is initially sought under the wrong subsection
of the statute.' Rather than overrule the forfeiture because of sloppy
"o See United States'v. One Lot of U.S. Currency ($36,634), 103 F.3d 1048,
1053-54 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. $87,118.00 inUnited States Currency, 95
F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Thirty-Nine Thousand Eight
Hundred Seventy-Three and No/100 Dollars ($39,873.00), 80 F.3d 317, 318 (8th
Cir. 1996); United States v. 9844 South Titan Court, Unit 9, 75 F.3d 1470, 1477
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Two Parcels of Real Property Located in Russell
County, Alabama, 92 F.3d 1123, 1126 (1 lth Cir. 1996); United States v. One 1973
Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 804 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Scrapp Investment
Co., Inc., 39 F.3d 1179 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion); United States v.
1988 Chevrolet Silverado, 16 F.3d 660, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Rural Route 1, Box 137-B, 24 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1994).
, United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 82 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111 $87,118.00, 95 F.3d at 518.
.
2 See United States v. All Assets & Equipment of West Side Bldg. Corp., 58
F.3d 1181, 1184 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Penny v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 698 (1996) (stating that"[tlhis lack of care on the partof the government
is hard to understand," but sustaining the forfeiture); United States v. Various
Tracts of Land inMuskogee and Cherokee Counties, 98 F.3d 1350 (10th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished opinion) (substituting sua sponte § 88 l(a)(6) for mistaken use of §
88 1(a)(7)).
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lawyering, the courts are willing to correct what is characterized as a
clerical error and proceed to the other matters at hand. 13 This behavior
suggests that the circuits tacitly approve of the burden-shifting mechan-
ism, and are more concerned with the result than the means used to achieve
it.
A second factor that is common when courts sustain forfeitures over
challenges to the shifting burden of proof is their disregard of acquittals in
criminal proceedings collateral to the forfeiture action. The circuits seem
to think that criminal acquittals count for very little when it comes time for
the claimant to present evidence about the guilt or innocence of the res.
This attitude creates inconsistency, in that it raises the question of how the
property can be guilty if the former criminal defendant (now the claimant)
is not. Nevertheless, it is plain that this kind of evidence is afforded little
weight, and therefore has little impact on the claimant's burden of proof.114
By contrast, a conviction in a collateral proceeding does not seem to affect
the court's view of the claimant, nor does it decrease the chance that the
claimant will prevail." ' In this respect, the circuits maintain proper
objectivity, in that their thinking is not swayed positively or negatively by
the outcome of a collateral proceeding. However, this behavior gives little
clue to the constitutional status of burden-shifting, because it deprives
scholars and practicing attorneys of a concrete basis for understanding
judicial thinking on civil forfeiture.
The third factor courts rely on is rebuttable presumptions. One example
is the drug courier profile cited in United States v. $49,576.00 U.S.
Currency.!16 As was pointed out in that case, the use of such archetypes is
only useful if the government can produce evidence to back up its claim. " 7
Another more common example is the presumption that carrying a large
" See supra note 112.
"
4 See United States v. One Urban Lot Located at Road 143 K 36.1, 14 F.3d 45
No. 93-1452, 1994 WL 9790 (1st Cir. Jan. 18, 1994) ("The outcome of related
criminal proceedings against [the defendant] therefore does not affect the probable
cause determination, or the burden shifting, in the civil forfeiture trial.").
15 See United States v. RR #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 871 (3d Cir. 1994)
(stating that a collateral conviction does not trigger res judicata or collateral
estoppel as to the forfeiture issue). Cf United States v. 9844 South Titan Court,
Unit 9, 75 F.3d 1470, 1477 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that where husband was
convicted in a collateral criminal proceeding, wife retained the opportunity to
present evidence and claim the property).
I" United States v. $49,576.00 U.S. Currency, 116 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997).
"
7 See id. at 427-28.
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sum of cash indicates involvement in drug activity.118 Many of the circuits
have been willing to hang their hats on this presumption in upholding
forfeitures, which suggests a belief that the system is correctly structured
and should be perpetuated. If there is a constitutional infirmity in this, the
circuits are willing to overlook it.
The fourth and strongest factor that can be gleaned from a close
reading of the cases is an explicit statement by a circuit court that the
burden-shifting mechanism is constitutional or does not violate due
process. Two such cases are White's Hill Road"9 and One 1970 Pontiac
GTO."20 Clearly, these rulings have been tempered by the later decisions in
Daccarett"' and $49,576,122 respectively. At present, there appears to be
only one other circuit court opinion that contains such an explicit state-
ment. In United States v. Chandler,13 the Fourth Circuit was confronted
with an as-applied constitutional challenge to the burden-shifting mecha-
nism where the claimant's farm was forfeited under § 881 (a)(7). In turning
aside the challenge, the court reiterated its earlier holding "that it is not
unconstitutional to shift the burden to the claimant, after the probable cause
showing, to prove his entitlement to the property."" 4
One explicit statement out of countless opinions in nine possible
circuits does not approach statistical significance. Two possible conclu-
"' See United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency ($36,634), 103 F.3d 1048,
1054 (1st Cir. 1997) (listing, in factors weighing against claimant, carrying a large
amount of cash); United States v. $87,118.00 in United States Currency, 95 F.3d
511, 519 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The amount, denomination and location of the currency
seized by the agents is also suspicious."); United States v. Thirty-Nine Thousand
Eight Hundred Seventy-Three andNo/100 Dollars ($39,873.00), 80 F.3d 317,319
(8th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e have recognized that possession of a large amount of cash
(here, nearly $40,000) is strong evidence that the cash is connected with drug
trafficking.").
" United States v. 228 Acres of Land and Dwelling Located on White's Hill
Road, 916 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1990); see supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text..
"'s United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976); see
supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
"- United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993); see supra notes 59-73
and accompanying text.
" United States v. $49,576.00 U.S. Currency, 116 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997); see
supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
"s United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994).
124 Id. at 367 ("Undoubtedly, Congress may alter the burden of proof in a civil
proceeding as it sees fit, without constitutional implications." Id. (citing United
States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added))).
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sions present themselves. One is that the members of the federal appellate
bench rarely contemplate the issue, which seems unlikely. The other, more
promising, idea is that judges consider this a settled issue - not settled in
the sense that there is nothing further to be said about it, but rather in the
sense that they believe the status quo is workable. In the same way that the
tone of judicial opinions concerning the burden-shifting mechanism
presumes its correctness, courts' failure to explicitly address the constitu-
tionality issue suggests a belief that there is no problem. Admittedly, it is
difficult to reconcile this reasoning with the decisions of the Second and
Ninth Circuits, but change moves slowly, especially in the law.
In closing this analysis, a word about another thing the opinions do not
say, for explicit statements about constitutionality are not the only things
missing. Scholars differ on the probative value of legislative history
materials, but many believe they provide invaluable insight about how a
germ of an idea became a piece of legislation. Scholars studying common-
law decisions do not have the benefit of a similar road map for the
workings of the judicial mind. When judges think out loud their musings
are called "dicta" and are disregarded in favor of specific holdings and
rationales. What this means in practice is twofold. First, it means that one
cannot be sure exactly what motivated the Second and Ninth Circuits to
move in the direction of discarding their previous rulings on the constitu-
tional status of the burden-shifting mechanism. There are no notes in the
margins of the opinions, no transcript of what was said at the Friday
morning conferences where the cases were decided.
Moreover, it means that one cannot predict which (if any) circuit might
rule next, or what might cause it to do so. In a well-constructed system of
justice, it is ironic that the answers to these questions are usually found in
memoirs penned after the robe has been laid aside and the last opinion
written. Such musings are the motherlode for the historian, but give little
comfort to practitioners charged with defending clients in an area of the
law whose shape is in flux.
IV. A LOOK AT LEGISLATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS
Any examination of civil in rem forfeiture makes clear that while the
system looks good on paper, it suffers from substantial problems in
practice. The Supreme Court, by its decisions in Good 125 andAustin, 26 has
already suggested the need to reform the forfeiture laws. This is apparent
'2' United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
126 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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from the small steps the Court has taken to protect claimants' rights. 127 This
section will look briefly at proposed reform legislation that awaits
congressional action. 128
A. The Hyde Bill
Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois has become the de facto
standard bearer for reform of the civil forfeiture statutes. 29 The 105th
Congress will mark Hyde's third attempt to get a bill passed that will
restructure the forfeiture process, making it fairer to claimants and
increasing their remedies while simultaneously increasing prosecutors'
burdens. 3 ' House Bill 1835 alters the government's burden of proof from
probable cause to clear and convincing evidence.' Representative Hyde
chose this standard because it relieves the government from the need to
prove guilt of the res beyond a reasonable doubt, but raises the burden from
the unnecessarily low standard of probable cause.12 This move would
roughly equalize the relative burdens of the prosecution and the claimant,
which should serve to prevent continued abuses of the system. The shifting
burden of proof appears nowhere in the language of House Bill 1835, the
theory being that proof of the offense should lie with the government. 33
127 See Part I.B.
128 Professor Bruce Voss notes that "[t]he irony is unmistakable - by the time
the Supreme Court finally forces the government to play by the rules, Congress is
ready to change them." Bruce Voss, Even a War Has Some Rules: The Supreme
Court Puts the Brakes on Drug-Related Civil Forfeitures, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 493,
538 (1994).
129 See HENRY HYDE, CATO INSTITUTE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS
(1995).
130 See H.R. 1835, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). Hyde's bill was previously
introduced as H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994), and again as H.R. 1916,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1996).
131 See H.R. 1835, § 2, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
132 In a statement before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Representative
Hyde explained that he chose "clear and convincing evidence" because it seemed
more reasonable and equitable than the other choices, probable cause,
preponderance of the evidence, and reasonable doubt. The first two choices were
characterized as being too weak given the interests at stake, while the last seemed
too strident a standard for a civil proceeding where no personal liberty is at stake.
See Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 3315
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, Feb. 22, 1994, 1994 WL 14168815 (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
133 See id.
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House Bill 1835 also seeks to alter other aspects of the civil forfeiture
process. It would eliminate the cost bond, which is a percentage of the
subject property's value that must be deposited with the court before a
claimant can oppose the forfeiture.'34 The bill also includes a provision that
would allow claimants to recover monetary damages for wrongful
destruction, injury, or loss while the government holds the property. 35
Finally, Hyde's legislation provides that claimants who are indigent may
have court-appointed representation.136 This final reform is especially
significant, as many in rem forfeitures go unopposed because the claimant
can afford neither the cost bond nor the cost of representation. 37 In sum,
the measure is intended "[t]o provide a more just and uniform procedure
for Federal civil forfeitures.' 38
B. The Conyers Bill
The bill originally proposed by Representative John Conyers of
Michigan is no longer pending legislation, having been allowed to die
without a vote.139 House Bill 3347 proved the adage that it is never wise to
try and fix everything at once. Conyers' solution was to completely
eliminate civil in rem forfeiture, allowing the government to forfeit
property only after the claimant was convicted in a collateral proceeding.
The bill found little support in the House, probably because it sought to
disband a system that has the potential to be workable with proper
reformation. Conyers himself is now a co-sponsor of the Hyde bill.
C. The Schumer Bill
It should come as no surprise that the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
has claimed a central role in the effort to reform the forfeiture process,
largely to keep the mechanisms favorable to the government. The
Department has joined forces with New York Representative Charles
Schumer to proffer the other pending reform bill. 40
'
34 See H.R. 1835.
135 See id. § 5.
136 See id. § 2.
137 See LEONARD LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY
130-37 (1996).
'
3 H.R. 1835.
" See H.R. 3347, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
'
40See H.R. 1745, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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Unlike the Hyde' proposal, Schumer's House Bill 1745 restructures
the cost bond requirement, making it waivable where the Attorney General
determines "that the posting of a bond is not required in the interests of
justice."'4 The Schumer bill makes no provision for court-appointed legal
representation of an indigent claimant. Similarly, there is no mechanism for
recovering damages where the government loses, destroys, or injures
subject property.
For purposes of this Note, the most significant aspect of the
Schumer/DOJ legislative proposal is that it retains the shifting burden of
proof. Unlike the present statute, however, the burdens are equalized. After
instituting a forfeiture proceeding, the government must prove its case
against the res by a preponderance of the evidence." If the prosecution
proves that the property in question is subject to forfeiture, the burden then
shifts to the claimant. The claimant is still required to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that her interest should not be forfeited.1
Claimants generally will view this proposal as less appealing than the Hyde
bill's elimination of a claimant's greater burden of proof, but it is still a
significant improvement over the disparity inherent in the present statute.
D. Evaluation ofLegislative Reform Attempts
From the previous discussion, it should be clear that civil in rem
forfeiture is a system with a number of problems. It lacks fundamental
fairness, and it places virtually insurmountable obstacles in the paths of
those whose guilt has not been proven. Given its historical roots in the
common law, it might even rightly be termed an anachronism. However,
it is critical to recall that forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 88 l(a) was meant to
be an extreme measure, conceived to combat the equally extreme problem
of drug trafficking in America.
That said, a critical look at the proposals themselves. It is clear that the
Conyers bill went too far, because the evils that civil forfeiture seeks to
combat are still present. Also, there may be cases where the forfeitable
property can be destroyed before its seizure, so that waiting for a convic-
tion in a collateral proceeding is not a realistic possibility.145
141 See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
142 H.R. 1745, § 101(a).
141 See id. § 20 1(e).
'44See id.
145 SeeUnited States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43,50-52,
57-58 (1993) (discussing the need to seize property for preservation while other
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The Schumer and Hyde bills are fundamentally at odds with each other,
because of their differing views on the shifting burden of proof. The wisest
solution seems to be to re-draft the statute so that the burden of proof is the
same for both parties, regardless of whether the quantum of proof required
is preponderance of the evidence, probable cause, or clear and convincing
evidence. Hyde's choices here seem preferable, because they roughly
equalize the burdens of proof and make the government's job somewhat
more arduous. By contrast, the Schumer bill has the preferable provision
regarding the cost bond: It is foolish to eliminate it entirely, because it
prevents some frivolous claims. By the same token, the bond should be
waivable where a federal trial judge determines that a claimant has a
legitimate stake in forfeited property but cannot afford the bond required
to institute a proceeding for recovery.
As a final thought, it should be noted that the outcome will be the same
regardless of what reform proposal is adopted. The government will still
win those cases where it adduces sufficient proof to legitimately forfeit
property. It will no longer prevail in those instances where the unequal
burden of proof is the linchpin of a prosecution. If such results become the
norm following passage of forfeiture reform, both fairness and justice will
be served.
CONCLUSION
In rem civil forfeiture in the context of drug-trafficking prosecutions
has been a fact of life for close to three decades. Despite its inherent
problems, Congress is still expanding the ways in which civil forfeiture is
used." What this suggests is that even with its inequities, forfeiture will be
a tool of federal law enforcement for the foreseeable future. How are the
courts to respond to the tensions created when claimants compete against
the government for the right to claim property?
The Supreme Court already has suggested, in Good" and Austin, 48
that it will no longer defer to all congressional judgments about civil
forfeiture. The restrictions in these cases, stemming from the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments, have started to map out the new shape of civil
proceedings are pending).
'
46 See United States v. Marolf, 973 F. Supp. 1139, 1145-46 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
("There are over 100 forfeiture statutes in the United States Code.") (citing JUDITH
SECHER, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (1995)).
141 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
"' Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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forfeiture, where claimants' due process rights figure more prominently
than they have in the past. Following these examples, the Second and Ninth
Circuits have taken the first searching look at the next constitutionally
infirm area of forfeiture, the shifting burden of proof.
Because those courts have reserved ruling on the constitutionality of
the burden-shifting mechanism, scholars are constrained to conjecture
about how the issue will be resolved. The Fourth Circuit has plainly stated
that it thinks burden-shifting passes constitutional muster - but not very
long ago the Second and Ninth Circuits shared that opinion. Which circuit
will speak next remains to be seen, but it seems certain that one of the
courts will rule dispositively on the issue.
This certainty stems from three sources. The first is that in the post-
Good and -Austin environment, the civil forfeiture statutes are no longer
inviolable. The Supreme Court has shown the way, and the circuits will
surely follow. Second, the existence of legislative reform proposals
suggests that even Congress recognizes it is time to reform the inequities
created by the present allocation of burdens of proof. Finally, as suggested
by Justice Thomas in Good, the day is coming when the Supreme Court
will "reevaluate [its] generally deferential approach to legislative judg-
ments in the area of civil forfeiture."' 49 This speaks directly to the issue:
Reform of civil in rem forfeiture is coming, and the question is not if, but
who, how, and when.
149 Good, 510 U.S. at 82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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